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Introduction   
As early as 1926 Paul Tillich claimed that phenomenology was 
“of decisive importance for the philosophy of the twentieth cen-
tury.” Phenomenology, he wrote, avoids “dissolving objects” 
through critical analysis, exploring instead “the essence of the 
things themselves quite apart from the question of their exist-
ence” (Tillich 1956: 75). Its basic premise is that it is difficult to 
capture the essence of everyday lived experience completely 
and accurately. This perspectivism (the experience of an object 
—such as a cube—from a certain perspective) is natural for em-
bodied human beings, who are restricted to a spatiotemporal 
view of the world. Objects are presented in experience as trans-
cending our experience of them. But how can experience be es-
sentially perspectival and at the same time present objects to us 
as transcending our perspective of them? Phenomenology at-
tempts to account for this possibility. For its founder, Edmund 
Husserl, phenomenology was the study of consciousness, and 
the intentionality of consciousness and its structures indepen-
dent of questions about the reality of the objects of conscious-
ness, investigations which that culminated—as Wessel Stoker 
suggests in his introduction—in the so-called “transcendental 
ego.”.  
 As what constitutes the world of objects for us from our 
experience, these structures are characterised by a certain trans-
cendence, although, at its simplest, phenomenology (later rede-
fined as the “science of being” by Husserl’s pupil, Martin 
                                                 
1 My thanks to Joeri Schrijvers for his comments on an earlier 
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Heidegger, for whom philosophy was as fundamental for “be-
ing” as religion was) is the study of the human aptitude for ex-
perience, rather than what transcends it. But by examining con-
temporary accounts of silence in phenomenology and theology, 
we can actually discover something of the human experience of 
transcendence and the constitution of that “transcendental 
ego.”. 
In distinguishing between immanent and radical transcen-
dence in his opening typology of transcendence, Stoker rightly 
draws attention to their corresponding philosophies of religion 
(what Tillich called “the two types of philosophy of religion”; 
Tillich 1959): metaphysical identity thinking (an identity between 
logos and reality or between thinking and being, such as that 
found in Friedrich Schleiermacher) and its critique difference 
thinking (being coincides neither with beings or thinking, as 
found in Heidegger).The “new phenomenology” exemplified in 
recent years by Jean-Luc Marion has been accused of being cor-
rupted by the introduction of a “God” usually excluded from 
phenomenological inquiry (Janicaud 2000: 16-103). This so-
called “theological turn” in French phenomenology exposes 
tensions between philosophy and theology—notably over the 
question of metaphysical theology or ontotheology, where di-
vine transcendence is compromised by philosophical and meta-
physical notions of being that claim conceptual equivalence 
with the God of biblical revelation. Ontotheology, Heidegger 
suggested, silences this God in favour of the ontotheological 
“God of the philosophers” (Stoker reminds us of this following 
his engagement with Tillich, specifically the death of “the God 
of ontotheology” at the hands of Derrida). Phenomenology of-
fers ways with which to address the manner of God’s appearing 
in the world without resorting to the often banal “metaphysics 
of presence” whichthat denotes ontotheology and thatwhich, 
according to Heidegger, characterised the history of Western 
philosophy. 
Jean-Yves Lacoste is a contemporary phenomenologist and 
philosophical theologian whose work blends Husserlian and 
post-Husserlian phenomenology (particularly that of Heideg-
ger) and the nouvelle théologie of Catholic theologians such as 
Henri de Lubac and Hans Urs von Balthasar, as well as re-
Comment [HJ1]: As religion was for 
him or for others, e.g.? 
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flecting the influence of Wittgenstein and the Danish philo-
sopher Søren Kierkegaard. Like Marion, Lacoste is interested in 
a post-metaphysical theology (Lacoste 2005b: 396) and employs 
phenomenology to push beyond Christian theology in order to 
respect that phenomenality, now freed from the “spectre of an 
ontotheology” that traps God inside propositional language. 
Drawing explicitly on Bertrand Russell’s distinction between 
“knowledge by acquaintance” and “knowledge by description” 
(Lacoste 2006: 117) Lacoste suggests that silence is instructive 
for theological epistemology, making available to us what he 
calls the transcendent “pre-discursive gift of the world.”.  
This essayThis paper will examine Lacoste’s treatment of 
ethics, transcendence and theology, beginning first of all with 
the relationship between phenomenology and transcendence in 
Lacoste’s work, specifically the issue of perception. As we shall 
see, for Lacoste, every phenomenon has the same right to be 
welcomed and described as any other: God does not differ from 
things in the world—both Deus and res can be semper maior. It 
will then discuss how, with reference to liturgy, the phenom-
enology of silence could might relate to divine transcendence, 
ethics, and intersubjectivity. 
Phenomenology and Transcendence 
Theology and Philosophy 
Unlike Marion, who in his own riposte to Heidegger “redraws 
the border between theology and philosophy” (O’Regan 2010: 
267), Lacoste is unconcerned with any strict distinction. Whilst 
his earlier work inhabited a border area that, “insofar as we 
understand it, is defined either by a co-belonging or by an 
uncertain belonging” (Lacoste 2006: 194), his recent work tries 
to move “above and beyond the division between the 
philosophical and the theological” (Lacoste 2008: 9). Theology is 
“the work of sinners,” whose “first sin is to treat God as an 
object, one whom we call the highest being” (Lacoste 2008: 206). 
Lacoste recalls Calvin”s question, “Wwho is God?” (Lacoste 
2010a: 60); divine phenomenality is, in fact, paradoxical, in that 
God is both res (an object of our discourse) and yet res semper 
maior (an object thatwhich transcends that discourse). With no 
recourse to an often facile metaphysics of presence, 
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investigating the phenomenality of God necessarily implies 
investigating all phenomenality, a strategy whichthat throws 
into question Pascal’s distinction between the God of Abraham 
and the God of the philosophers (Lacoste 1996: 384). Lacoste 
also questions whether if knowledge can “capture God? As 
soon as it is asked, one has to admit that that question is a 
hypocritical one.” Only theology “seizes God inside a proposi-
tional language that is intended to be cognitive: proficient on 
one hand, true on the other” (Lacoste 2008: 205). 
Is therefore the problem “with theology nothing more than 
that of its language?”(Lacoste 2006: 169).? If so, then perhaps si-
lence offers us “a healthy lesson in theological epistemology” 
(Lacoste 2006: 172). Silence is typically understood negatively—
representing discomfiture, anger, dejection, concession or even 
“being at a loss for words,”, while the quiet vastness of the uni-
verse terrified Pascal. Even when and where silence is valued, it 
is still within a negative register—as the absence of noise, for in-
stance. 
Reflecting on silence allows Lacoste to rethink both Hus-
serlian thought and its relation to God. For Lacoste, the con-
junction between philosophy and theology can be explored 
through the analogy between the transcendence of a phenom-
enon and the transcendence of God, while liturgical religious 
experience provides the basis for an alternative phenomenol-
ogy, uninhibited by artificial disciplinary boundaries. 
Perception and Transcendence 
But is this “new phenomenology” practised by Marion and La-
coste no longer phenomenological, having instead been cor-
rupted by the introduction of “a god—the biblical God—who 
does not belong there” (Janicaud 2000: 3-4)? This God does not 
“belong” in phenomenology because Husserlian phenomenol-
ogy is concerned only with that which appears, and since a 
transcendent God does not appear as an object for intentional 
consciousness, then God—and all God-talk—is excluded from 
phenomenological inquiry.; Iindeed, Heidegger himself argued 
that such a “phenomenology of the inapparent” would be non-
phenomenological. 
For Merleau-Ponty, however, phenomenology offered a 
means of “relearning” to look at the world, one which provided 
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its own foundation. It is characterised by an attentiveness and 
openness to the world whichthat Heidegger (1962: 58) 
summarised as the means “to let that which shows itself be seen 
from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.”. 
Intentionality is the central idea of Husserlian phenomenology: 
all consciousness is consciousness of something. There is an 
important correlation between the intentional act (noesis) and 
the intentional object (noema): in other words, nothing can be 
given to me apart from the way in which I receive it. 
Phenomenological description thus focuses upon the 
intentional act, or the horizon, life-world ([lebenswelt)] or 
language -game (Lacoste 2006: 104) of the subject; 
phenomenology itself is predicated on the so-called 
“phenomenological reduction” or the “bracketing out,”, 
thatwhich restricts noematic analysis to the contents of 
consciousness, regardless of whether or not anything 
corresponds to these representations in the visible—or 
audible—world. 
The “paradoxical revelation of Transcendence … at the 
heart of phenomenality” has provoked apprehension (Janicaud 
2000: 23). Lacoste, whose phenomenology seeks to re-examine 
the distinction between subject and object, offers a modest con-
cept of divine transcendence, one grounded, firstly, in the 
observation that “sense perception, in the Husserlian account, 
deals organically with transcendence,”. and, sSecond, in the 
positionly that “the realm of phenomena is larger than the 
realm of perceived entities”—which leads Lacoste to ask what it 
is that appears to us in our affective experiences—thereby 
suggesting “one or two things about the way God appears 
while transcending his present apparition”(Lacoste 2007b: 1). 
Thus, Lacoste begins with the cube, the classic phenomen-
ological example of the limitations of our perception: the para-
dox of its phenomenality is that we immediately recognise it 
even though we are unable to see all of its faces simultaneously. 
As Lacoste notes, 
In the Husserlian treatment of perception there is no need 
to “describe” a cube in order to know it. We see the cube, 
though sensation “presents” only part of it to us.... The cube 
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is here “in the flesh”, leibhaft da. And yet what is presented 
here and now is not the whole thing” (Lacoste 2007b: 2). 
Our “perception” therefore is not a singular, punctual exper-
ience—instead we perceive, silently, in and over time; time, 
indeed, “is given to us ... to enable what Husserl calls 
‘synthetic’ perception.” This synthetic perception is a synthesis 
of “adequate” and “inadequate” perception: as Lacoste sug-
gests, a “wholly adequate perception,”, (that is, a comprehen-
sive perception of the whole of the thing, or the whole of its per-
ceivable reality) is “an ideal and only an ideal. […] The compre-
hensive experience of an object, in fact, has only the possibility 
of an infinite experience” (Lacoste 2007b: 3). Time allows us to 
correct our mistaken interpretations of res semper maior. 
Transcendence, therefore, is a possibility of our daily, quo-
tidian perception: our senses present us with only “fragments 
of reality” that our perception synthesizes. Its temporal limits 
are clear: the “over-dimensioned” transcendental ego “en-
dowed with the power of perceiving comprehensively” is not a 
human ego; no eschatology of perception is conceivable—at 
least, no “human eschatology of perception” (Lacoste 2007b: 3). 
The possibility of transcendence is not only a part of our every-
day possibility, but it is the condition of the very possibility of 
philosophy: 
Things exist in as much as they invite themselves to us. 
Were we but able to render account of this invitation, were 
we only to perceive that it is not in disguise that things ap-
pear to us, and were we, finally, to know the conditions 
under which consciousness is open, all the work of philo-
sophy would be, by right, achievable. (Lacoste 2003: 68) 
Philosophy after Heidegger understands no eschatology except 
death, and invites us only “to a long drawn-out labour, an in-
vestigation.… When work is done, a philosopher may have no 
‘findings’ to show” (Lacoste 2007a: 264). Lacoste distinguishes 
this from the kerygmatic urgency imposed upon theology by its 
eschatological expectation and its commission to communicate 
the “good news.”. The product of the languages of the Greek 
logos and Jewish hope, Christianity represents a third language, 
one that tries to ensure the intelligibility of that kerygma in a 
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plurality of languages. In the particular language of biblical 
texts, theology discovers a God (whose speech it only partially 
comprehends) not by virtue of a universal transcendental ap-
titude but through the particular language of the biblical text. 
This hermeneutical detour does not remove the kerygmatic ur-
gency but qualifies the labour of theology as an ongoing work 
of love or charity [caritas]. In other words, if the analogy be-
tween the transcendence of a phenomenon and the trans-
cendence of God is to be maintained, then what is true of the 
cube in philosophy must be proclaimed in the grammar of theo-
logy. It is on such a basis that Lacoste argues for a profound 
continuity between philosophy and theology. 
The appearance of something to consciousness is more 
than simply “being presented by our senses.”. At some passive 
level we synthesise the different sides or aspects of an object 
(such as a cube) and can perceive it as unified. Synthetic per-
ception deals simultaneously with what appear (what are 
presented by our senses) and what do not appear (what are not 
presented by our senses). To return to our earlier example: we 
perceive it as a cube rather than the particular “side” of the 
cube thatwhich is currently visible to us. Once we acknowledge 
that we perceive the cube, albeit “inadequately,”, Lacoste 
reasons, we must also acknowledge that the invisible is part of 
what we perceive. While we do not see the invisible, we can 
perceive the invisible: the visible refers (“symbolically”) to the 
invisible (although what is presented by sensation and what is 
presented symbolically should not be confused). Crucially, this 
same passive level includes our disappointments and affections 
thatwhich also enable us to perceive things. 
These things can always transcend their actual phenomen-
ality: as Lacoste notes, “most of the furniture of the universe” is 
absent from “the field of my consciousness” (Lacoste 2007b: 4). 
This matters little in daily life. But what does appear to me is 
“partially absent as well, and this does matter ... because it 
discloses a major law in the logic of experience” namely that 
“perceptive experience deals simultaneously with the phe-
nomenal and the nonphenomenal.”. In other words, “percep-
tive experience deals also with the non-perceived” (Lacoste 
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2007b: 4); phenomena “do give us the thing itself—but they 
give it to us obscurely” (Lacoste 2003: 71). 
So, we in fact perceive more than our senses present to us. 
Our description also implies knowledge of the invisible (or the 
inaudible); this knowledge is granted to us by the visible which 
that lets the invisible appear. Care ought to be taken not to 
expect too precise a knowledge of the invisible: as Lacoste 
observes, Husserl himself was at pains to point out that the 
logic of belief is never far from the logic of perception. Lacoste 
even suggests that Janicaud actually made “a major 
phenomenological blunder” when he assumed that 
phenomenology deals only with the visible (or the audible), and 
“that the play of sensory ‘matter’ and intentional ‘form’ gives 
access to the visible and the visible only.”. In fact, there is no 
perception of the visible without a co-perception of the 
invisible: “perception grasps—Auffassung—simultaneously the 
visible and the invisible” (Lacoste 2007b: 5). 
Affectivity and Silence 
Phenomenology recognised early on that affection is crucial to 
the discernment of truth: Husserl’s understanding of the “ade-
quacy” of the experience of an intentional object included the 
possibility that one also felt that object. The idea that self-con-
sciousness and transcendence were inextricably linked also be-
came a central concept in the philosophy of religion, particular-
ly in Schleiermacher’s definition of religion as a “taste for the 
infinite” or a “feeling of ultimate dependence” ([Gefühl schlecht-
hinniger Abhängigkeit)]. This feeling (what Stoker in his typology 
labels “immanent transcendence”) represented the transcendent 
ground of the dependent self-consciousness in self-
consciousness, through which humanity comprehends the 
transcendent ground of its self and which that Schleiermacher 
identified with God. This feeling is all too often mistaken for 
transcendence (Lacoste 2006: 97); our liturgical experience 
remains pre-eschatological and “promises us no ecstasy” 
(Lacoste 2004: 26). Lacoste’s conception of liturgy arises from 
his dissatisfaction with the traditional philosophy of religion: in 
his own words to articulate 
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a non-“religious” (i.e., anti-Schleiermacherian and anti-
Jamesian) logic of “liturgy” (not worship!)—that is, of what 
man does coram Deo ... as subverting the Heideggerian logic 
of being-in-the-world. (Lacoste 2010b: 657) 
Tillich himself suggested that Schleiermacher “injured the un-
derstanding of religion” when he divorced “feeling” (as the reli-
gious function) from will and intellect, thereby “excluding reli-
gion from the totality of personal existence and delivering it to 
emotional subjectivity” (Tillich 1959: 23, 24). Theology “is never 
founded on the limited basis of our experience of God” (Lacoste 
2010a: 63). While we can feel God’s presence—or, at least, what 
we construe as such—”we can just as much feel the presence of 
the ‘divine’ of which Heidegger speaks … God must not be as-
similated too quickly to the sacred or to the numinous” (Lacoste 
2010a: 63). Attempting to escape the interminable faith-reason 
dichotomy, Lacoste explores the paradoxical divine phenomen-
ality in terms of “love”: God is “connaissable comme aimable” 
which thus raises the possibility of something, perhaps even an 
understanding, “in which humanity exceeds its definition of 
‘rational animal’“ (Lacoste 2008: 88).  
But the believer does not necessarily love their neighbour 
as a consequence of their love for God or vice versa. They sim-
ply feel—the phenomenology of perception reminds us that our 
experience of the world is not limited merely to what we might 
describe but can include our affectivity (love, joy, frustration) as 
a fundamental possibility of that experience. Lacoste’s phe-
nomenological analysis is rooted in an understanding of this 
“pre-discursive gift” of the world to the self, prior to conceptual 
language. Here then, in the silence of perceptive life, an order is 
established thatwhich includes the presence of subjectivity in 
that world. Words are themselves phenomena and things are 
given to us through words. But in Husserl nearly all conscious 
life is organised in their silent margins—his later philosophy 
might even be described as a theory of deferred or “bracketed” 
speech in which “things, which are given to consciousness as 
phenomena, both constitute and are formed within the sphere 
of the silent life of our consciousness” (Lacoste 2006: 117). And 
if one takes seriously the question of the phenomenality of 
God—that is, “God as love” rather than “God as being”—then 
Comment [HJ2]: Is this his insertion or 
yours? 
Comment [HJ3]: Same question. 
10                                                     LOOKING BEYOND? 
 
within the order of that perceptive life one should also take 
seriously the question of our coaffectivity—that is, our shared 
perceptive life with others experienced at those margins. 
What Husserl called an act of “presentification” [Vergegen-
wärtigung] described an intentional act whose object, although 
intuitively given, is not immediately present. Empathy is thus 
an “appresentation” of the lived experience of another person: 
although only dimly perceived, the other person’s body gives 
me access to his or hertheir lived experience while also making 
me realisze that this lived experience remains inaccessible to 
me. The praying human community is, Lacoste contends, a 
pacified—or at least pacifiable—community; those who are 
liturgically occupied with God “must at least have it as their 
goal” while the identity of others is expressed in this 
imaginable affective communion. However, the “God to whom 
we pray is not necessarily a God felt in the heart.”. Similarly, 
the other person with whom I pray “is there with me more than 
the sensibility can suffer him” (Lacoste 2005a: 100).  Empathy is 
thus, phenomenologically, a presentification of what is absent 
as invisible; theologically, indicative of the non-phenomenal 
divine love. When we pray in communion, “we accept with an 
open heart the presence of all those with whom we pray, visible 
and invisible, near and far, known and unknown, nameable 
and anonymous.”. Thus “to pray together is to have something 
to say and do together, to participate together in a drama” (La-
coste 2005a: 100); a common participation that is provisional 
and eschatological, sought in liturgical participation rather than 
simply discovered within our “shared sensibility” or any “affec-
tive communion.”. Although located within the pre-discursive 
structures of the world, this communion is something one must 
strive for as “pilgrims” (Lacoste 2006: 134). Lacoste here pushes 
beyond the Heideggerian analytic into a realm “beyond being” 
through a horizontal move into human experience of the world, 
away from the solitary life of Dasein. 
Kunneman, as Stoker observes in his discussion of the 
third type, suggests that today “the name of God [is] connected 
with caring, morally involved, loving relationships both be-
tween people mutually and on the level of person” (Kunneman 
2005: 67). Lacoste examines the profound example of theology 
Comment [HJ4]: Or: presentation? 
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“being silenced” in the face of the suffering of others (Lacoste 
2006: 169). In these remarks on theodicy, Lacoste makes clear 
that it is both “a scandal” and “mystery” where “no response is 
heard which that does not include some reference to “the words 
from the cross.”. And this is truly where the most responsible 
theology is silent” (Lacoste 2006: 171). 
Silence discloses the essence of perceptive life—the co-af-
fectivity thatwhich is the ground of our compassion. In the 
sphere of this silent, co-affective life, an order where such 
passive syntheses combine to form our experience of the world, 
“sympathy” is thus also “suffering -with.”. Compassion 
demands that we do not discuss the suffering of others without 
also feeling it ourselves. The experience of compassion forces us 
to admit that human relations transcend the limits of mere “co-
being” or Heideggerian “care” ([Mitdasein Fürsorge)]; it 
is to learn that he who suffers is, above all, waiting for us to 
hold their hand, not because we are unable to speak 
intelligently, but because … we have exceeded the limits of 
argumentation” (Lacoste 2006: 171-72) 
It is also to learn and that “there is a time to speak, a time to be 
quiet and a time to heal” (Lacoste 2006: 180). 
Theology and Transcendence 
Love and Silence 
Heidegger did not dismiss every account of presence, but 
sought a more originary—that is, phenomenological—account 
of the presence of beings in their coming into presence in being 
and in time. Concerning the question of how God might ap-
pear, Lacoste draws upon his concept of Befindlichkeit (Heideg-
ger 1962: 178; 492 n.) and how the affective life—notably love—
possesses cognitive content (Lacoste 2007b: 15-16). But while 
emotions can “act as consciousness,”, they can “lack identifiable 
and describable objects” (Lacoste 2010a: 63). Compassionate si-
lence—concern for the other person—reminds us that theology 
is only able to speak of God by stating that he is a (loving) God 
to whom humans can talk, thus “it is a theologically fruitful ex-
perience to be quiet in order to pray and to sympathise” (La-
coste 2006: 173). Lacoste’s phenomenological analysis therefore 
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distinguishes Heideggerian and Christian forms of liturgy—
and thus God from “the sacred”—and refuses to separate 
“love” and “being” (in the way that Marion does) amid genuine 
concern that “any scheme in which the self or community finds 
the satisfaction of its desire in what bedazzles” (O”Regan 2010: 
273) is idolatrous. Humanity instead searches for understanding, 
particularly recognition of God as lovable and that that love is 
perceptible (Lacoste 2008: 87-110, echoing 1 John 4:19); one I 
might even be correct in saying “that I have perceived a divine 
presence in a manner as convincing as I perceive human pres-
ences,” as “presences that require being known as putting pres-
sure on me from outside myself” (Lacoste 2010a: 64). Human 
affectivity is that existential condition from which hope can an-
ticipate its fulfilment, directed towards a transcendence ahead 
of and above it. 
It is at this point that the “liturgical gesture” transcends the 
capacities of speech, reminding us once again that keeping si-
lent “does not mean the same as being absent” (Lacoste 2006: 
171). Thus “to sympathisze” is also to “pray -with”—Lacoste 
does not differentiate between the two actions. The theologian 
cannot tell someone “why” they are suffering, or what 
“meaning” their suffering has, except by exhibiting the 
“elementary tact or good sense to turn the sufferer’s gaze 
toward him in whom God has suffered” (Lacoste 2006: 172). 
Here, then, compassion means “talking about a compassionate 
God [and] preserving the language of the cross ...” (Lacoste 
2006: 171). In contrast to Kunneman’s suggestion of a shift to 
horizontal transcendence, the Christian practice of silence “must 
be rooted in some respect in the life of Christ himself if it is to 
be meaningful or even in some way normative” (Brownsberger 
2009: 595). Stoker himself mentions the biblical experience of 
immanent transcendence, specifically Tillich’s claim that the 
biblical God is unique in combining both elements of 
transcendence and immanence in the incarnation. Here the 
phenomenon of Gethsemane provides a theological paradigm: 
“Jesus speaks and, when he has spoken, there is silence” with 
no suggestion “that he expected a reply” (Lash 2004: 75). One 
may also recall Christ’s silence before Pilate or Jesus’ silence in 
death—his tomb is empty, silent. Yet it is in this 
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disappearance—his absence—that Jesus becomes a sign of God 
semper maior.  
Lacoste’s proposal is that, in being silenced, theology is re-
duced to its essence: a theologia viatorum and not the theology of 
angels and saints,; that it is not just a province of knowledge 
but “a way of existing and of existing in the plural” (Lacoste 
2006: 172). Reminding theologians that they are something 
besides “an interpreter[s] of rationality is to say that theology is 
a form of existence before it is an intellectual work, and that 
compassionate silence is an integral part of theological 
experience.”. Keeping silent may concede that argument no 
longer holds, but that does not abrogate every theological 
project: it merely demonstrates that “theological experience 
would be incomplete if one reduced it solely to a work of 
conceptual construction” (Lacoste 2006: 172). In urging 
theology to be quiet, suffering forces it to remember that the 
theological experience is not solitary but one lived in the 
element of an original plurality. This plural existence is one that 
recognises the polysemy of both silence and the scriptural 
witness, and resists the reduction of “God-talk” to a univocal 
metaphysical—that is to say ontotheological—language. The 
God of the silent, perceptive life is not an object of intentional 
consciousness but the ground of our fundamental affectivity. 
Conclusion 
At the interstices between phenomenology and theology La-
coste has sought to reveal the ground and limit of human con-
sciousness encountering an irreducible transcendence. That 
ground is the pre-discursive affective gift of the world, the com-
mon “vie spirituelle” shared by philosopher and mystic alike 
(Lacoste 2006: 218-9). Irreducible to human logos, God differs 
from things (perhaps, recalling both Derrida and Stoker’s final 
typology, even to the point of non-alterity). However, that dif-
ference does not introduce a caesura in the field of knowledge 
but makes us attentive to the multiplicity of modes of appear-
ance; phenomenality is not “uniform” (Lacoste 2010a: 49). As 
Lacoste observes, some phenomena—such as God, or the other 
person—are irreducible to language: “[t]he right description,” 
in the case of God as well as that of the intersubjective “en-
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counter,” requires “the transcendent reality of what it de-
scribes.”. Neither the existence of the other nor the existence of 
God can be put aside: “not due to a personal decision … but be-
cause to call these existences phenomenologically indispensable 
to description is merely the right response to their proper mode 
of phenomenality” (Lacoste 2010a: 66). Here these two phenom-
enalities—that of the love of God and of the other person—are 
analogous. 
Keeping silent, therefore, is an immanent activity, a kenotic 
activity thatwhich exemplifies Stoker’s typology of the open 
concept. And, as Stoker suggests, once the concept of 
transcendence is differentiated, then its differences and 
overlaps can be perceived more easily. Amidst competing 
discourses about transcendence, silence is something that cuts 
across typologies; reflecting upon silence helps to clarify their 
relationship and, confronted by kerygmatic haste, teaches 
theological patience. As Lacoste”s “silent reduction” makes 
clear, the “accuracy” of theological concepts is easily upset by 
the polysemy and polymorphism of scripture. Lacoste instead 
offers an “asystematic theology of the fragment” (Lacoste 2006: 
189): as with perceptive life, a fragmentary understanding is 
nevertheless an understanding. A theology prepared to silence 
its arguments for the sake of compassion is able to speak non-
conceptually, to be only a marginal note to the scriptural text, 
and one which understands its own logos—the coherent but 
fragmentary understanding of God in history. Despite Hegel’s 
ambitious claims regarding immanent transcendence, the 
transcendent God is not made manifest to us through some 
banal ontotheological metaphysics of presence. Lacoste’s 
rigorous eschatology reinforces this point—the once and for all 
character of the Christ -event, recounted in a plurality of 
narratives, defies the theologian’s hypocritical speculation; 
theology that takes its transcendence seriously is an 
unsystematic, fragmentary and, above all, ethical activity. 
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